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Glossary B
Glossary B
The financial world is full of jargon -
i.e. strange words no-one understands. Here we
try to explain some of the many technical terms.
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Back-end Load
Sales commission charged at the time of
redemption rather than at the time of purchase.
The opposite situation is termed a front-end
load, which is more common among pension fund
charges, and which can result in very poor
performance. In general, it is better having a
back-end load than a front-end load; with a
front-end load, the charges are being compounded.
Back Testing
Testing a model against past data. Back testing
is easy in StockWave - you just select some data
and run an algorithm against it; the output
predictions can then be checked against what
actually happened.
Back testing is a good way to discover suitable
parameter values for the analyzers; e.g. suppose
you want a prediction for next month - you are
using the previous 3 months data and have been
playing around with various choices, and getting
results which are in disagreement. What you could
do is to take data for the 3 months previous to
last month, then vary the parameters until you
get a reasonable prediction for last month; now
try these parameter values for the last three
months to get your prediction. Note that this
technique is not foolproof - nothing is - but can
work quite well.
The reasonableness of using back-testing in model
selection is that we do not expect the underlying
process, i.e. the generative model itself, to
change very much over time. Of course, it is
possible and likely even, that the 1972 behaviour
of the Dow Jones is nothing like the 2004
behaviour - the dynamics of the market will have
changed, but the difference between the June and
July 2004 behaviour will not be that great.
Share prices can change a lot in a month, so
what do you mean the differences will not be that
great ...
Yes, that is right, but we do not expect the
underlying model to change. Consider for a
moment, physics - the study of the universe as it
is; the goal of physics is to find the laws that
govern the universe - these laws, i.e.
mathematical models, that we find are called laws
because they do not change over time - the law of
gravity does not change from month to month. As
far as we can see, there are no universal laws
about the stock market, and the models which we
build are only effective, if at all, for a short
time.
Back-Propagation
A common type of neural network - the basic
workhorse of the genre. Structurally it consists
of a number of interconnected layers, each layer
being made up of a number of processing elements.
The network is trained by applying {input,
output} pairs of training data, known as facts,
then adjusting the interconnection weights
according to the training algorithm.
Backwardation
A term relating to futures trading - the opposite
of contango.
Bad Publicity
News which will depress a share price.
Bail Out,
Government
An emotionally-charged phrase.
Large companies sometimes get into difficulties,
then go crying to the government to 'bail them
out' - i.e. cover or write-off their losses, or
give them some money in some other way. Of
course, it is never expressed in such terms - and
using such language can result in a very bitter
response indeed. Most companies in trouble will
see themselves as special cases, and will
say very angrily that it is 'not a bail-out'.
Unfortunately, rather than let the free market
work as it is supposed to - unprofitable
companies should fail, and should
be allowed to go bankrupt - governments often do
bail the company out, usually to avoid unpleasant
political repercussions - workers losing their
jobs, or as is more common, earning the ire of
the City. Of course, it is the taxpayer who
ultimately pays for this 'corporate
welfare'.
It should be noted that while companies often ask
for taxpayers money when times are hard, in the
form of a bail-out (or its cousins, the tax-break
and the subsidy) there is never any desire to
offer the taxpayer a dividend or a profit-share
when times are good. In theory, profitable
companies will benefit society as a whole through
the taxes levied on these profits, but this is
often not the case; many highly profitable
corporations largely avoid being fairly taxed via
the use of offshore financial structures.
Balance Sheet
The numbers in the company report - the 'bottom
line'.
Common terms you might see quoted are -
-
Market Capitalisation =
number_of _shares*share_price = the total worth
of the company on the market
-
Price to Book = market cap. /
shareholder funds
-
Price to Sales = market cap. /
annual sales
-
Profit Margin = profit after
tax / annual sales
-
PE Ratio = market cap. /
profit after tax; (low is good)
-
Gearing = net debt /
shareholders funds; (high is bad)
-
Enterprise Value = market cap.
plus debt
If in doing any analysis based on these, and
other, so-called 'fundamentals' one should
consider the totality of the data, and its
relative comparison with that of other companies
in the same sector; individually these numbers
mean very little, especially as they can be
subject to gross manipulation.
Banana Republic
Various, usually Latin American or Central
African countries with military-led or
militaristic governments and poor human rights
records. The economic aspects of these regimes
usually involve control of their natural
resources by foreign corporations and a massive
national debt, typically run up by buying
expensive weapons they do not need or else on
moderately-priced weapons which they will use
against their own citizens; places you would
neither want to live-in nor visit.
Barrier Option
A type of derivative. A barrier option is
exercised when the underlying price crosses a
trigger level - the barrier.
These kind of options are a step up in complexity
from vanilla options and as such are somewhat too
exotic for the small investor; also, they are a
little bit ... sneaky. For an ordinary
option the important thing to have a handle on is
the probability above or below the breakeven
value on the exercise date - with barriers it is
more complicated; the barrier can be triggered by
any single crossing within the time period, so
the path of the share price is important,
not simply where it ends up. If the underlying
security has enough volatility, then barrier
options may be a great deal more likely to
trigger than one might naively think. Pricing of
barrier options could still be done via the
techniques found in StockWave, but it would
require some modification, and is not considered.
In general, the financial whizzkids are forever
inventing new types of ever more exotic
derivative to tempt the buyer; the more exotic,
the less likely the buyer is to properly
understand them, hence the advantage lies with
the seller. The golden rule in these situations
is a simple one - if you do not understand
what you are buying, then walk away.
Bear
Someone who believes the market will fall. A bear
market is thus one in general decline.
Bear Call Spread
An options trading strategy; the trader sells a
lower strike price call and buys a higher strike
price call; the trade has both limited profit and
limited risk.
Bear Put Spread
An options trading strategy; the trader sells a
lower strike price put and buys a higher strike
price put.
Betting
Staking money on the outcome of an event with
odds gained from a
bookmaker; basically, the
punter is trying to make money
in the short term, which is seen as bad and a
social evil, and is even illegal in some places;
usually the pastime of the working classes, it is
not as respectable as investing - which is seen
as socially responsible and a 'good thing'. Of
course, betting, investing and speculating are
all, really, functionally identical and what is
more, the distinction is becoming ever less
obvious as bookmaking firms extend themselves
into financial betting and brokers realise that
the investor needs more attractive trading
opportunities than the simple buying-of-stocks.
Bid Price
The price at which you can sell - 'Bid to get
Rid'
When trading shares, or any kind of security,
there are always two prices, the bid and the
offer; the offer price is what you will pay to
e.g. buy a stock, the bid is what you get when
you sell. Obviously, the offer price is always
higher than the bid price (- except in very
exceptional circumstances); the difference
between them is known as the
spread, and equally obviously,
the smaller this is, the better for the investor.
Spreads exist to allow the market makers to make
a profit; the job of the market maker being to
'make' a market, i.e. create
liquidity - the ability of the
security to be both bought and sold; markets
don't work otherwise.
Prices quoted on free data services are usually
mid-prices, so if you want to
estimate the bid/offer prices you should factor
in, say +/- 0.3%; if you need an actual price,
you have to phone a broker. Spreads vary, so shop
around.
An options pricing model, developed by Black,
Scholes and Merton. It tells you what an option
is worth, in theory; with this formula we would
hope to identify 'under-priced' options.
It is difficult to overstate the impact of this
formula on the world of derivatives trading; when
it came along it was regarded as being
'startlingly accurate' and was perhaps the first
real breakthrough in financial mathematics. For
the first time, traders could have confidence in
what the value of an option was - this led to a
surge in derivatives trading and lucrative job
opportunities for PhDs in maths and sciences,
which continues to this day.
The derivation of the formula involves regarding
the underlying share price as a continuous
markov process, and making the
following assumptions -
- The stock pays no dividends during the
option's life
- European exercise terms are used
- Markets are efficient
- No commissions are charged
- Interest rates remain constant and known
- Returns are lognormally distributed
In the hands of a trained mathematician, the
final result is a type of diffusion
equation (- a variety usually found in
the theory of heat transport), and most
importantly, one which allows its
solution in a relatively neat
formula -
call_premium = current_price * N1 - strike_price * exp (- interest_rate * time_left_to_expiry) * N2
How to explain what this means?
Well...if you look at the equation you will see
that what you should pay to own the option
depends on the current price and the strike
price, as you might expect, multiplied by
statistical terms N1 and N2 which, to put it
crudely, represent the likely movement of the
share price, plus a time decay factor in the
final term. So e.g., at expiry the second term
will simply be the strike price and the first
term will be the current price - which makes
sense; the fair value is simply the difference
between the prices.
Note that strictly speaking, all of the model
assumptions are
false; one can have a very good
argument over whether the assumptions can be
justified or not - all we can say is that some
are easily adjusted for, others not so -
- Most companies pay dividends to their share
holders, but the model can be altered in this
case by subtracting the discounted value of a
future dividend.
- European options can only be exercised on the
expiration date while American options can be
exercised at any time during the life of the
option; this is not a real problem since most
American calls are only exercised very close to
their expiration date; this is because when you
exercise early, you are losing the time value of
the option.
- Markets are not perfectly efficient but are
instead 'quite efficient'. Exactly how
efficient one needs markets to be for the
assumption to be a good one, is not clear.
- Commissions can wipe out your profit; this is
a big issue for the smaller investor.
- There is no such thing as the 'risk-free
interest rate'.
- Returns have 'fat tails'. This means that
real share prices are subject to a more severe
form of randomness than in the model.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Black-Scholes
over-estimates the value of in-the-money options
and under-estimates the value of out-the-money
options (- for an excellent and highly insightful
exposition of the deficiencies of the Black
Scholes model you should get hold of the paper
'The Holes in Black Scholes' by Fischer
Black.)
Despite the hype surrounding this model, it is
really only an application of the theory of
Brownian Motion; Einstein worked this out at the
turn of the last century (- his first major piece
of work), some 60-70 years before Black and
Scholes.
To end the story, the inventors won the
equivalent of the Nobel Prize for Economics (-
there is no actual award for economics)
and proceeded to go on to create their own
hedge fund, Long Term Capital
Management, which made amazing investment returns
for super-rich investors until the day they got
it very badly wrong and nearly destroyed
Capitalism itself.
Pricing of options is done automatically in
StockWave via the use of the probabilistic
predictors (- generated by Monte Carlo
simulation), and the payoff graph - you don't
need the Black-Scholes equation. StockWave makes
no assumptions whatsoever; it simply measures
what is, then takes it from there.
Black Hole
Not a "collapsed star whose mass causes such
extreme gravity that not even light can escape
from it", but instead an accountancy
colloquialism - it refers to a large deficit in
the accounts; a place where there should be
something, but isn't; a massive shortfall. In
practice, black holes are either due to extremely
optimistic financial planning at the outset of an
enterprise, which ends up leaving a funding gap,
or due to fraud - i.e. money has just been
'disappeared'. Stolen. Nicked. Pilfered.
One commonality with the black holes of
astrophysical origin, is that when matter -or
money- falls into them, it is never seen again.
Blame
'It wasn't me - a Big Boy did it and ran
away!'
The childish protestations of my youth flush me
with such nostalgia ..., but getting back
to the point - no one likes to take the blame,
much better if it is someone else's fault - when
the shit hits the fan in the markets, the Blame
Game starts with a vengeance, the views expressed
being barely above the childish level of small
boys, for example -
- Investors blame analysts for giving
lousy, partisan advice.
- Analysts blame their employers, the
investment banks for pressurizing them
into being positive on crappy-arsed stocks.
-
Auditors are bent, totally cowed to
their corporate paymasters.
-
Accountants are dodgy, unwilling to
jeopardise lucrative consultancy work.
- CEOs bloated with stock options inflate
earnings figures.
-
CFOs collude with their CEOs to
fabricate these inflated forecasts.
- Hedge Funds and speculators who
short-sell the market are to blame for
massive drops.
- Daytraders, who don't understand the markets,
create volatility.
- The government is to blame for
business-unfriendly policies.
-
Derivatives caused it, absolutely no
doubt.
- Rumours posted on the Internet
caused it.
- The government is to blame for being in
the pockets of big business.
- Whatever it is, its not my fault,
don't ask me - I don't know, and if I did, I
probably don't remember exactly what happened.
Please conduct any further enquiries through
my attorney ...
And etc. The only excuses which don't seem to be
used are low self-esteem and the
lack of a male role model - which is a
nice change. Everyone sues everyone else and sits
tight, hoping the government will bail them out
with taxpayers money - then its back to business
as usual.
Blue Chip Stocks
The biggest companies listed on an exchange, e.g.
the Dow Jones, FTSE 100 or Eurostoxx 50; large
multinational, multi-billion dollar corporations.
The term comes from poker where the blue chips
have the greatest value.
Book Value
This is assets minus liabilities (- shareholder
equity per share); e.g. land, property,
inventory, cash minus e.g. debts. Should give an
indication of the liquidation (- break-up) value
of the company.
The problem with this number lies in deciding
exactly what is defined as an asset, and what its
value actually is - the usual accountancy tricks
apply. To be believable one has to have some
confidence that the assets listed could be sold
off relatively quickly for the cash value they
are listed at. Obviously, there are some heavy
assumptions being used here.
Almost meaningless in practice.
Bond
A bond is,
basically, an IOU. The value of which therefore
depends on the credit-worthiness of the
issuer.
Bond markets are
sometimes referred to as the 'Fixed Income'
sector.
Boom and Bust
Stock prices shooting up, then crashing back down
again. A natural cycle which despite the best
attentions of governments and central bankers, we
cannot get rid off.
Bounded Variation
A mathematical term - it means that when we look
more closely at a function, it becomes better
behaved - smoother, straighter. This important
feature is the reason why some mathematical
techniques are possible in many situations, e.g.
a lot of the time we can approximate an unknown
function with a smooth curve, which we know how
to manipulate. The opposite situation is where
this 'better behaviour' does not arise no matter
how closely we move in - share prices would seem
to have this nastier, wilder behaviour; they
always seem 'jaggy' no matter what scale we
observe them at, the only limiting factor being
the maximum resolution of the data feed.
Broker
A stockbroker - someone who sell stocks.
Brokers make their money - and it is a very good
living indeed - by charging
commission, which can be a flat
rate or a sliding percentage - the more stocks
you buy, the less you might have to pay. Good
customers may get preferential rates. Some
brokerages also give advice, but considering that
ultimately a broker wants to sell you stock, you
can imagine what the value of this is. If you are
on good terms with your broker, you may have the
facility to short-sell also, thus giving you more
flexibility in your trading strategy.
Broker
Recommendations
Usually buy, and almost never, ever, a sell. All
things being equal, one might expect these to be
equal in number. Other recommendations comprise
meaningless waffle like: accumulate
carefully, or firm hold. If a
broker really knew something important about a
company, then he shouldn't - the only
worthwhile information is insider information,
and if he does know something, why would you
expect him to offer it for free?
Bubble Dynamics
If you are a keen watcher of financial affairs
you will be aware of the phenomenon of the
Bubble; this is when valuations of some asset
become extremely exaggerated, but persist and
grow for a considerable period, eventually
however, the bubble 'bursts' and prices revert to
more reasonable levels. Bubbles are very
destructive phenomena, especially to the small
investor. What is particularly worrying is how
this phenomenon seems to recur and spread across
successive markets - they appear everywhere.
Dealing with bubbles poses severe problems for
current market orthodoxy, for according to the
Panglossian worldview of Adam Smiths free and
perfect market, bubbles should not exist - the
invisible hand should disrupt them before they
even appear.
So much for orthodoxy - does anyone really
understand what is going on??
To be honest, we don't know, so ... let's work
our way around the problem, discuss its features
and then try to formulate some easier questions
that we can attack ...
Can you identify a Bubble?
Alan Greenspan famously said something like
"bubbles are only identifiable after they have
burst" - which is little bit like saying "Ponzi
schemes are only identifiable once everyone has
been bilked, and the founder has all the cash
..." Most normal people would tend to disagree
with this - in the real world we are used to
seeing systems which are under stress and then
collapsing once some threshold has been reached,
that is to say, there is a measurable parameter
to which we can look for information. In theory
one could try and identify some parameter which
could describe the bubbles we see in the various
markets, but although finding plausible
indicators is not overly difficult, developing a
theory around them with which to describe the
stress of the given bubble, and more importantly,
the critical point at which it will collapse, is.
Very much so.
In the stock markets we could take the price to
earnings ratio as a parameter - this is a measure
of how much one is paying for a given unit of
company profit. In bubble periods PE ratios can
become absurdly high. Although there are rules of
thumb for what a reasonable PE ratio is, these
may vary across sectors. In short, this number
does not seem to be a reliable indicator; ideally
one would like to simply say - "... PE ratios for
this market are crazy, this bubble is about to
pop ..." - then short a lot of stock making huge
profits in the process, but alas this strategy
could leave you seriously burned.
In the housing market we could look at the ratio
of average house price to average yearly earnings
- this is a good candidate, especially
considering that the maximum mortgage allowed by
lenders is only 3 times earnings. Obviously then,
anything close to 3 for an overall average is
becoming stressed. The trouble is, this number is
over 5! Even more troublesome ... it has been for
some time!! The immediate extra factor here is
interest rates - because they have been very low,
the affordability factor, i.e. average monthly
repayment on average house to average salary, is
historically low. Unscrupulous lenders have also
allowed the abuse of 'self certification' of
salary by mortgage applicants; a nod and a wink,
an acceptable number is suggested, but no
background checks are done. Other practices have
included the popularisation of 'interest only'
mortgages and 100% mortgages (- i.e. no
downpayment or deposit needed). Competition is
fierce, lenders will lend to almost anyone.
Of course, if interest rates shoot up, lots of
people will start feeling the pain, but its wrong
to reason this will lead to a crash simply from
the viewpoint of 'affordability' - after all this
depends on all the 'other stuff' that is coming
out of the persons salary, i.e. other loans, food
and energy bills. Most people will sacrifice
lifestyle before their house, their 'castle' - so
we also need to take account of consumer spending
(- a measure of 'lifestyle') and energy prices,
i.e. oil. Our attempt to build a model is
starting to flounder; even if somehow we could
get together a good data-set, the predictions
will likely be all over the place.
There are even more difficulties to deal with; so
far we've been using 'averages' but these don't
tell us the whole story, in fact it may be the
distribution of extreme cases (- how many people
are really out of their depth, or close to it)
which are most important when triggering a
cascade effect, leading to a widespread crash.
The housing market also has its own
idiosyncrasies - it is very localised, varying
greatly area by area, buying and selling property
is a slow process.
Why don't obvious bubbles burst? How can they
persist for so long?
Like in our discussion of the housing market
above, it is clear that when there are several
parameters in the model, it is very hard to make
headway. Instead of looking for a critical point,
we have to deal with a critical (hyper-) surface
and the range of stable/quasi-stable behaviour is
so much greater.
Let's look at a physical model as an analogy - a
system with sudden, unexpected behaviour between
long periods of stable, yet apparently unstable,
states -
When I was a child I'd go to the amusement arcade
- electronic games had only just appeared, so
most were mechanical; one I particularly liked
was called the Penny Falls - it was 3 stepped
platforms, oscillating to and fro irregularly
against each other, each platform was covered in
coins, so when the platforms moved some would
fall from the top to the bottom; the bottom layer
usually had a large collection of pennies built
up into a vicious overhang over the payout
bucket. The object of the game was to aim a penny
along a rail onto the top layer in such a way as
to trigger a successive falling of pennies from
layer to layer - you were trying to make the
overhang at the bottom collapse so that e.g. one
penny in, would lead to 30 or 40 pennies in
return.
The thing about the Penny Falls was how it was
easy to convince oneself that the bottom overhang
was 'ready to fall at any moment' and the sense
of surprise and frustration as successive pennies
were aimed, yet seemed to have no effect - 'why
won't that bloody overhang collapse!' Then,
usually when one was becoming convinced it had
been glued in place by an unscrupulous operator,
it would fall. It was always a surprise.
Always.
When examing the system there is a tendency to
concentrate on the size of the overhang - this is
the most obvious thing to do, but then we become
psychologically fixated upon it to the exclusion
of other factors. The pennies tend to spread out
when landing on a layer, filling up any gaps that
are available, and when there aren't any, they
will slide over each other; the friction between
the pennies plus the weight of those lying on top
presses down, holding the lower ones in place and
so provide a counterbalancing force to the
overhang, so there is more stability and
significantly more holding capacity than one
might imagine. But the system is only
quasi-stable and will still collapse,
eventually.
Just because the dynamics of a bubble are more
subtle and complex then one can envisage, does
not mean its not a bubble anymore; it is still a
bubble, except that the final transition it makes
will be even more unpredictable and serious than
you can imagine; even more reason for you to stay
away from any involvement. When the cheerleaders
start carping on about 'soft landings' 'new
paradigms' or 'this time its different' - do not
believe it; a bubble is still a bubble.
Can you stop Bubbles?
[- Now this is a very good
question!]
In theory I suppose so, yes, well maybe, or maybe
not ... it is in fact one of the things the
central bankers are meant to do on behalf of
their political masters, but they also need to
grow the economy otherwise everything starts to
unravel (- our economic system needs growth to
remain stable.) Politicians obviously want to
keep their jobs, so growth is the target. Naively
chasing growth leads to cycles of Boom and Bust -
which is what we don't want, hence it is the
considered aim of all politicians to generate
steady
growth, with all the nasty ups and downs, and
bubbles and booms and recessions, smoothed
away.
A famous quote about the role of the central
banker is something like "take away the punchbowl
once the party gets started". Another famous
quote is by Mr Greenspan again who once talked of
"irrational exuberance" of the markets, then
proceeded to spike the punchbowl at his
particular party. So much for famous quotes.
What people are supposed to do or say they are
doing, and what they are actually doing are often
in violent disagreement. Central bankers have a
lot of power, access to the best information and
analysis; they are also very secretive and have
lots of meetings with each other to coordinate on
an international level, e.g. at the BIS; when
they do talk to the public they do so with a zen
koan-like opacity designed to confuse the great
unwashed while, perhaps, sending subtle signals
to the enlightened ones.
If its not all a big conspiracy, then why do
they make it look so obviously like it is a big
conspiracy ... ?!
This is not an unreasonable question, but its
unwise to get into the wilds of speculation-land.
(Having said that, if you want something juicy,
try reading about Montague Norman, head of the
Bank of England in the early part of last century
- he was a very strange man, given to cloak and
dagger shenanigans, not unlike some kind of
proto-Bond villain, e.g. his desk had a secret
switch which could flood the banks vaults in an
emergency!)
Officially then, central bankers are apolitical,
lacking any personal agenda - mere public
servants serving the general interest of us all
by trying to bring growth and stability to our
economies, and not the "high servants of the
elite carrying out their nefarious agenda".
I'm glad we've got all that sorted out
...
But still, ... with all the resources they've got
- the Ivy League 'big brains', the information
streams, the fancy computers - their track record
of bubble prevention is not good at all. Of
course, one might argue, that without their
intervention everything would be ten times worse
than it is, and that really they are doing a
splendid job - were they less secretive we may,
in fact, be able to give them a lot more credit
and respect than we do so currently.
Maybe, we're still asking the wrong questions?
[Cui Bono:] Does anyone benefit from Bubbles
(theoretically, hypothetically)?
Yes. Very much so. If you knew their timing you
could profit by buying on the way up *and* then
by selling on the way down, *and also* when
everything was back down at rock bottom, you
could then go on a shopping spree, buying up real
assets, for an absolute song; its a triple-whammy
slam-dunk saccharine-overload
sweet-sweetbacks-badass-deal-of-the-century
...!!
The only thing you need then to bring off such a
coup is greater insight, luck or information than
anyone else. Greater insight would call for
actually building a model, to start with you
would need a bunch of PhDs, a supercomputer,
access to vast streams of realtime information
and a lot of time; most folks are lucky to have O
Grade Maths, a Pentium PC and BT (not-very)
broadband. If you believe in Luck, then why not
try the Lottery, give all this complicated stuff
a miss; someones got to win that £1 million
prize - it could be you! Information - and I
don't mean the drivel you get in newspapers,
finance Web sites, TV shows or even investment
magazines - is what you really need; high quality
information known only to well-connected
insiders, e.g. changes of direction in monetary
policy, or the first warning signs of impending
trouble.
The 'better informed', or 'sophisticated' can
thus afford to ride the tiger all the way to big
profits; hypothetically, if you were in this
position, you would not actually care about
bubbles, quite the opposite, you would relish the
opportunities they present; sophisticated
investors are also usually diversified, and can
move their money in and out quickly at the first
signs of trouble. As long as the
people-that-really-matter can get to the
lifeboats first, there is no real interest in
eliminating bubbles; worrying the general public
is just likely to cause a panic.
In the book 'Wall Street' by Doug Henwood, an
anonymous trader is quoted as saying:
"Anyone who doesn't know something no-one else
knows is a fucking
chump ..."
- the general public are just that; a bunch of
'fucking chumps' whose wellbeing, financial or
otherwise, is of no interest whatsoever to those
with real power.
Bull
Someone who believes the market will rise. A bull
market is thus one where share prices are
generally rising. Everyone loves bull
markets because it is so easy to make money -
just buy almost anything at all and the chances
are it will go up in value; there is always lots
of deal-making and piles of cash floating about -
the lucky City Boys get rich on fat fees and
commissions plus their huge Christmas bonuses.
Its really easy.
One of the problems with a long bull run is that
hardly anyone is willing to believe it will come
to an end; most City Boys are pretty young - the
idea is to come in, work the
high-stress/long-hours culture for about 10 years
then retire in ones early 30s - the so-called
'fast burn'; to these young men, bear markets
existed only as a theoretical possibility (- you
know they exist, but you've never
actually seen one yourself) - you would
have had to have been 'really old' to remember
back the last time.
With this conditioning of expectation, every new
low is seen only as a 'blip', a 'correction' or
as an 'adjustment' - you start to disbelieve your
own senses; when it starts to hit home, it is too
late. BTW - anyone who wishes to blame the
problems of the markets on Osama, Enron or
Andersen, should take a good look at the charts -
the rot had set-in well before these events.
Bull Call Spread
An options investing strategy; the trader buys a
lower strike price call and sells a higher strike
price call.
Bull Put Spread
An options investing strategy; the trader sells a
higher strike price put and buys a lower strike
price put.
Butterfly Spread
Selling (buying) two identical options, together
with the buying (selling) of one option with an
immediately higher strike, and one option with an
immediately lower strike. All options are the
same type, with the same underlying and the same
expiration date.
This is an investment strategy that doesn't
really impress us; you simply buy a 'good' stock, and
hold onto to it for a long period, usually many
years.
The idea is that over the long
term, the fluctuations
of the market will cancel each
other out, i.e. in the short term, which is any
period less than years, one simply ignores
what the stock is doing, whether good or bad,
safe in the knowledge that whatever is going on
is merely a 'fluctuation'. This is the kind of
strategy that takes brave men - the questions you
must ask are -
- When does a 'fluctuation' become a 'trend',
and
- What is a 'good' company in the first place?
(We don't know!)
But there is some justification for this strategy
- take a look at the chart of one of the indices;
the data goes back almost 20 years - and you will
see how it shows geometric growth, mostly - when
you zoom in you will see a different story, but
that is entirely the point - one simply ignores
the short term issues. The charts of the major US
blue chip stocks also show this very clearly.
The obvious problem of picking an individual
'good' stock to invest in can be resolved to an
extent by choosing a collection of stocks to
spread the risk - a portfolio.
But even choosing the right collection of stocks
is still very difficult; this rather tricky
business of stock-picking was apparently resolved
in the late 1990s by the idea of index
tracking; observing that most professional
stock-pickers, i.e. the fund managers, as a group
were incapable of beating the overall market
index, the fashion was to buy a tracker fund,
since "whatever happened to individual stocks,
the overall index would go up, right?!" Well, no,
not really, but the buy-and-holders would still
argue that one should simply bitter out the bear
market, as a bull will follow shortly.
These are some reasons to believe the
buy-and-hold argument, but there are also strong
counter-examples - e.g. Enron and Marconi, two
cases which show how even once large and
highly-respected, blue-chip stocks can go all the
way down to the floor. As for indices, the
Japanese Nikkei has been going sideways for an
entire decade at around the 10000 mark, while
falling from an all-time high of around 40000 -
the buy and hold argument relies on there being
another bull market coming along soon after,
should a bear arise for a year or two; in Japan
this hasn't happened - waiting for the upturn
could turn out to be a bit like Waiting for
Godot.
So when does the buy-and-holder finally run for
cover? Theoretically, he doesn't - but in
practice, the answer is that he usually gets out
far too late.
It is generally regarded as being part of the
received wisdom of investing that Warren
Buffett uses buy-and-hold, but is not
strictly true; there is a lot more to his
strategy than that - while there are a few
'inevitables' as he calls them, many stocks are
held for only a couple of years. It should also
be pointed out that Berkshire Hathaway (- his
company) do an incredible amount of their own
research on a company before they go anywhere
near it; they also buy entire companies as
investments - this is one sure-fire way to make
sure the company is being managed properly, and
that the books have not been cooked. Buffett is
clearly a sophisticate, but seems to enjoy and
accept the public relations benefits of his
received image - folk-wisdom and home town values
from the 'Sage of Omaha' whose traditional
commonsense is superior to the whizz-kid rocket
science of Wall Street! Ordinary folks love this
kind of thing, and if it helps his business, why
not?
In summary, we regard the buy and hold strategy
as being nothing more than over-optimistic
laziness.
Buying on Margin
This means using borrowing to finance your
trading. The reason for doing this would be to
create leverage on a trade, i.e. to multiply the
expected profit level. It is, on the whole,
pretty dangerous and should only be used for
short term trading scenarios. We do not recommend
it. If you decide to use this tactic, be very
aware of your total exposure, and basically -
just don't get out of your depth. Remember that
in short-term leveraged-trading, positions can
change very quickly indeed, so you need to
monitor the situation very closely.
"Buying on margin" sounds rather too anodyne in
our opinion, so if you are tempted - for whatever
reason - substitute the phrase 'borrowing
to gamble' - then ask yourself whether
you still want to do it. Generally speaking, do
not gamble/invest/speculate with money you cannot
afford to lose.
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